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Abstract - This paper presents an experimental analysis of people’s behavior in situations involving 
both positive and negative reciprocity. The experiment implements sequences of two types of 
extensive form games called Punishment games and Trust games. The contemporaneous use of 
these two types of games allows us to define an ideal framework for understanding the basic 
elements of reciprocal behavior. Results show that the level of trust and punishment are consistent 
with the view that emotions are involved.  
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1 Introduction 
This paper studies human behavior in games with underlying reciprocity responses. We 
use the explication of reciprocity given by Fehr and Gächter: “Reciprocity means that in 
response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more 
cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile 
actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal” (cf. Fehr and Gächter, 2000 
a, pp159.) In this definition there are two implicit concepts: positive reciprocity and 
negative reciprocity. People respond to friendly or hostile actions disregarding material 
incentives.  
Experimental results from ultimatum bargaining games, trust games, gift exchange 
games, public goods experiments, and social dilemma games show evidence for 
reciprocal behaviors (negative and positive reciprocity). In the experimental literature we 
can find several explanations for the evidence of reciprocal behavior: (i) inequality 
aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999); (ii) person-based 
response: people respond to the type of person they face (Levine, 1998); (iii) intention-
based response: a desire to reward good intentions or punish bad intentions (Kagel et al., 
1996; Brandts and Solà, 2001; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2000); boundedly rational 
behavior (Roth and Erev, 1995; Gale, Binmore and Samuelson, 1995.)  
Reciprocity has been modeled as evolutionarily stable behavior (Güth and Yaari, 
1992; Bowles and Gintis, 1999.) In this sense, reciprocity represents the best strategy in 
terms of fitness, i.e., no other strategy can enter the population and perform better. Bolton 
(1997) shows how a 50-50 split in a bargaining problem is a rational strategy in an 
evolutionary framework, i.e., it is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).    2
Young (1993 b) theoretically indicates 50-50 split as stochastically stable division in 
the bargaining problem characterized by two bargainers randomly matched from two 
classes of agents
1. This unique stable equilibrium arises as a result of the evolutionary 
bargaining process when mobility between the two classes is allowed
2. In this case 50-50 
split is a “convention”, meaning a self-enforcing and expected pattern of behavior 
(Lewis, 1969; Sugden, 1986). 
The theory of Reciprocal Altruism (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; 
Axelrod, 1984) is consistent with the evolutionary approach. This was noticed by Dawes 
and Thaler (1998): “An implication of reciprocal altruism is that individuals will be 
uncooperative in dilemma situations when there is no possibility of future reciprocity 
from others, as in situations of anonymity or interacting with people on a ‘one shot’ 
basis.” But the experimental evidence is in favor of a more “radical” definition of 
reciprocity
3: people engage in reciprocal behaviors even in single interactions (evidence 
of 40-60 percent of socially optimal contribution in “one shot” public good experiments; 
evidence of 50% trust and 75% reciprocal behaviors in the single play Trust Game by 
McCabe and Smith, 2000.) Therefore, reciprocal altruism gives a limited explanation of 
the observed cooperation (and reciprocal behaviors).  
                                                 
1 See Young (1993 a) for a formal analysis of the stochastically stable equilibria. This analysis is based on 
graph theory. Stochastic stability is explained by the dynamics of the process of equilibria selection in a 
no-learning and no-reputation environment. The theory does not assume common knowledge over 
agents’ utility functions. 
2 The stochastically stable division is the asymmetric Nash solution in the cases of homogeneous agents (in 
terms of utility function and information) in both classes. Uniqueness is achieved if precision of demand 
tend to 0. The asymmetry arises for the difference in the amount of information. The class with more 
agents has more information. When both classes are characterized by heterogeneous agents, the 
stochastically stable division is still a unique asymmetric Nash; but in this case the asymmetry arises for 
the difference in the distributions of types between the two classes, and not for their relative dimension. 
3 In analogy to the concept of strong reciprocity. See Gintis (2000) for an evolutionary model.   3
Our hypothesis is that human minds have a propensity to establish long-term 
reputations as cooperators and non-defectors, and consequently people are willing to 
incur the risk that their anonymous counterparts are like-minded persons (see Coricelli, 
McCabe, and Smith, 2000.) This hypothesis implies that some subjects in single-play 
extensive form games will opt, or respond to, moves whose intentions are to signal a 
desire for positive reciprocity, and the achievement of greater individual as well as social 
surplus than if each agent played opportunistically
4. This perspective only partially 
explains the pattern of trust and reciprocal behavior in our experiment. In addition, we 
assume that experienced emotions matter.  
The specific emotions that are related with negative and positive reciprocity are anger 
and elation. Anger (elation) is related with counterfactual thinking
 (see Lewis, 1973; 
Roese and Olson, 1995; Kahneman and Miller, 1986) that arises when individuals 
compare the obtained outcome with better (worse) outcomes that might have been 
realized (see Niedenthal et al., 1994;  Zeelenberg et al., 1998).  We use the terms upward 
or downward counterfactual when the obtained outcome is compared with better 
outcomes or worse outcomes, respectively. Anger and elation result from upward and 
downward counterfactual, respectively. 
In the case of reciprocal interaction the obtained outcome depends on the decision of 
two or more agents. We refer to anger (or elation) if the individual will feel just partially 
responsible of her final outcome. Indeed, she will attribute the responsibility of her 
outcome to another individual or group of individuals
5. The counterfactual reasoning 
allows the individual to focus on the alternative outcome that she would have obtained if 
                                                 
4 Opportunism means that one is only interested in own monetary payoff. Standard game theory assume 
common knowledge of opportunism. 
5 For consideration about responsibility see Connolly and Ordoñez, 1997; and Zeelenberg et al., 2000.   4
the other individual (or individuals) had behaved differently. This process is based on the 
attribution of intentionality to the other individual’s behavior (see Rabin, 1993; Brandts 
and Solà, 2001; and Falk et al., 1999.)  
In the specific of our experimental framework distinct emotions are linked to the 
appraisals of responsibility for the determination of the final outcome, in accordance to 
the appraisal theory of emotion (see Frijda, 1986; Frijda et al., 1989). “When people 
perceive some other person to be the cause of their misfortune, they feel angry; when 
people perceive impersonal circumstances beyond human control to be the cause of their 
misfortune they fell sad; when they perceive themselves to be the cause of their 
misfortune they fell guilty” (cf. Keltner et al., 1993, pp 741.) 
 We assume that the experience of anger and elation affects individual choice. We 
name these emotions as “reciprocity-based” emotions. In particular, experienced 
reciprocity-based anger increases the willingness to punish (even if this is costly), and 
decreases trust. Even though we did not use a direct measure of emotional arousal, we 
strongly believe that our experimental results show the presence of reciprocity-based 
emotions and their effects to the levels of trust and punishment.  
In the next section we illustrate the design and the procedure of our experiment; 
section 3 briefly reports the experimental details; section 4 reports our results; and section 
5 concludes the paper with discussion.   
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2 Experimental design and hypotheses 
Subjects participate in two-player extensive form games. The games are of two types: 
Punishment Games (P)
6 and Trust Games (T)
7 (see Fig.1). The subjects play two 
sequences of games. Each sequence is composed by three games of the same type (trust 
or punishment). 
There are 6 subjects for each experimental session. The subjects are matched 
following the matching rules described in Fig. 2. These two types of games (P and T) are 
introduced in order to study negative and positive reciprocity. In the punishment game 
the first player can move left, ending the game and splitting an amount of money, or 
move right and possibly obtain a greater payoff for herself and a smaller payoff for the 
second player, if the second player does not punish her. Punishment occurs if the second 
player moves right, thus ending the game with zero payoff for both players. 
The sequence of punishment games is characterized by an increase in the difference 
between the payoffs that the second player would have gotten if the first player had 
played non-opportunistically (moving left)
8, compared to the payoffs if the first player 
moves right and the second does not punish her (moving left). These differences are 26, 
31, and 36 experimental dollars, for the first, second, and third punishment game. 
                                                 
6 The punishment game is a truncation of an ultimatum game. In the two-person ultimatum game the first 
mover proposes how to divide an amount of money, a pie. The responder can either accepts or rejects the 
offer. If the second mover rejects the offer, both end up with nothing. Experimental results show a mean 
offer of 30-40% of the pie, and offers below 20% are almost always rejected. 
7 The trust game is a simplified version of an investment game (see Berg et al, 1995). The Investment 
Game is a two-person sequential game; the first mover (player 1) must choose how much of $10 to send 
to the second mover (player 2). Both players know that the amount sent will be tripled when it reaches 
player 2. Player 2 must then decide how much of the tripled money to send back to player 1 (and how 
much to keep). The money sent back to player 1 does not triple again. Game theory predicts that rational 
agents playing once will act as follows: player 2 has a dominant strategy to keep all of the tripled money 
sent by player 1; player 1 should infer this behavior by player 2, and therefore send nothing. In fact, this 
does not happen. Over 90% of the player 1s exhibit some degree of trust by sending some amount of 
money, and over a third of the player 2s show themselves to be trustworthy by sending back more than 
player 1 initially sent. 







































Note: In each game player 1 moves first by playing “left” or “right”. If player 1 moves “left” the game is 
over. If player 1 moves “right” then player 2 can play “left” or “right”, ending the game. Wherever the 
game ends, player 1 gets the first payoff and player 2 gets the second payoff. 
[38,38] 
















































Fig. 1. (a) Sequence of extensive form punishment games: P1, P2, and P3, respectively.  
(b) Sequence of extensive form trust games: T1, T2, and T3, respectively.   7
 In this sequence the cost of punishing (i.e., the difference between the second player’s 
payoff of moving left and moving right) is the same (i.e., is equal to 12 experimental 
dollars in each game.) It is identical also the improvement in the first player’s payoffs for 
moving right and the second player moving left (i.e., is equal to 30 experimental dollars 
for each one of the three games of this sequence.) The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
solution is always to move right for the first player and always to play left for the second 
player. Different behaviors indicate deviation from the standard game theoretical 
solution. If the first player moves left, ending the game, she behaves non-
opportunistically. If this is the case, the second player can compare the obtained outcome 
with the worse outcomes she would have obtained if the first player had moved right 
(downward counterfactual.) This comparison would determine a positive emotion 
(elation) as a response to the first player’s behavior. If the first player moves right, 
playing opportunistically, the second player would experience worse outcomes. In this 
case, the result of upward counterfactual induces anger.  
The second sequence of games is composed by three trust games. In the trust game 
the first player can move left, ending the game with a small payoff for both players, or 
she can move right, giving to the second player the opportunity to choose between 
reciprocating and defecting. If the second player chooses left, she and the first player get 
more than the first possible outcome; whereas the game ends with her maximum payoff 
and with a zero payoff for the first player if she chooses right. In this game if the first 
player moves right, she trusts the second player to reciprocate (i.e., not to move right). 
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution is always to move left for the first player 
and always to move right for the second player.  In the sequence of trust games (see Fig.   8
1b) the potential benefit (in terms of increasing payoffs if the second player reciprocates) 
for the first player to move right (trust) is the same for the three games (i.e., is always 
equal to 27.) The difference in payoffs for the second player between moving right 
(defect) and moving left (reciprocate) is always equal to 34 experimental dollars. What 
varies through the sequence is the difference between the second player’s payoff when 
she moves left (reciprocate) and her payoff when the first player has ended the game, 
moving left (these differences are: 38, 40, and 42 for the first, second and third trust 
game, respectively.) In other words, what varies is the benefit that the second player gets 
from the first player’s trusting behavior. In this way first and second players’ patterns of 
behavior through the three games are explained by their motivation in terms of 
reciprocity.   
In the sequence of trust games the first player can experience anger from the second 
player’s defecting behavior. If the second player goes right, the first player gets a payoff 
of zero experimental dollars. In this case, and also in the case in which she cannot trust 
the second player (she moves left), she might compare her payoff with a better non-
obtained payoff (upward counterfactual.) When the first player moves right and second 
player moves left, the first player would compare her payoff with worse payoffs 
(downward counterfactual.) This would determine elation and appreciation of the 
reciprocal behavior of the second player.  
The last part of the analysis focuses on the relationship between the two sequences. 
We assume that subjects are carrying over emotional experience from one sequence to 
another, and different emotional experiences determine different behaviors. For this 
reason we introduce two conditions. The subjects in condition 1 (punishment-trust) play   9
first the three punishment games and then the three trust games; whereas in condition 2 
(trust-punishment) subjects play first the three trust games and then the three punishment 
games. The matching protocol for condition 2 is described in Fig. 2b. This protocol is 
identical to the first one with the order of the two sequences inverted. Figs. 2a and 2b 
show that the position (first or second mover) of the players in the sequences is the same, 
and it is alternating, i.e., the subjects that were players one in the first sequence are 
second players in the second sequence, and the opposite for the others. 
(a) 
SEQUENCE 1   SEQUENCE 2 













































Fig. 2. (a) Matching Protocol. Condition 1. (b) Matching Protocol. Condition 2.  
SEQUENCE 1  SEQUENCE 2 













































(b)   10
We formulate two behavioral hypotheses related with the difference between the two 
conditions.  
Hypothesis 1  The proportion of punish behavior of the second players in 
condition 2 is higher than in condition 1. 
 
Hypothesis 2 The proportion of trust behavior of the first players in condition 1 
is lower than in condition 2. 
These two hypotheses are based on considerations about subjects’ emotional experience 
through the experiment. Having experienced opportunistic behavior from the others 
increases negative reciprocity, and decreases trust in positive reciprocity. 
 
3 Experimental Details  
Subjects do not know the matching protocol implemented. They know that they are 
always playing with a different opponent from game to game, but they do not know with 
whom they are playing. Anonymity is maintained; subjects are paid separately and with a 
double blind procedure. The experimenter knows just the ID number of the subject for 
data analysis purposes, but does not know the corresponding name. This procedure is 
made clear through the instruction. The games are not labeled. The subjects are informed 
on their position before playing a game (e.g. first player or second player). The subjects 
see all the payoff information, and players 2 see the move of players 1 before making a 
decision.  
The subjects of our experiment were 78 undergraduate students from the University 
of Arizona. 48 subjects participated in condition 1, and 30 subjects participated in   11
condition 2. They received 5 US dollars show up fees and two of the payoffs obtained 
during the experiment. The two payoffs, one from each sequence, were randomly chosen 
at the end of the experiment. This procedure has been introduced in order to avoid 
endowment effects. The payoffs were converted at a rate of 10 Experimental Dollars to 1 
US dollar. The experiment was computerized. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Means choice proportion: Punishment games 
The result of the experiment shows that 68 percent of the first players in the punishment 
games had opportunistic behavior, i.e. they moved right; and 25 percent of second players 
responded punishing them (moving right). The mean proportion of opportunistic behavior 
of the first players in the punishment games does not change significantly along the 
sequence (see Figs. 3a and 3b.) This is true in both conditions (McNemar test, P1 vs. P2, 
p-value=0.23; P1 vs. P3, p-value=0.79; and P2 vs. P3, p-value=0.51). As shown in Figs. 
3c and 3d, the proportion of punishment increases along the sequence (Kruskal-Wallis 
test=2.61, p-value=0.27). In particular, there is a significant increase from the first to the 
second punishment game, and then there is a drop of punishment in the last game, this 
proportion being anyway higher than the first game.  
 
4.2 Means choice proportion: Trust games 
In the trust games 50 percent of the first players trusted the second players, and 45 
percent of them reciprocated. Figs. 4a and 4b show mean choice proportions of first 
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 (c) Second players in condition 1            (d) Second players in condition 2 
 
 
Fig. 3. Mean choice proportion of punishment games: (a) First players in condition 1; (b) 
First players in condition 2;  (c) Second players in condition 1;  (d) Second 
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(c) Second players in condition 1            (d) Second players in condition 2 
 
 
Fig. 4. Mean choice proportion of trust games: (a) First players in condition 1; (b) First 
players in condition 2; (c) Second players in condition 1;  (d) Second players in 
condition 2.      14
level of trust significantly decreases from the first game of the sequence in both 
conditions (McNemar test, T1 vs. T2, p-value=0.02; T1 vs. T3, p-value=0.03), but does 
not varies from the second to the third game of the sequence (McNemar test, p-value=1). 
Figs. 4c and 4d show a significant increase in the proportion of second players’ reciprocal 




4.3 Interaction between first and second players’ behavior 
Table 1 presents a contingency table with the first players’ behavior (rows) in the 
punishment game conditioned to the second players’ earlier moves (columns). The chi-
square test shows that we can reject (p-value=0.0025) the hypothesis of independence 
between rows and columns of this contingency table, i.e. first players’ behavior depends 
from past (t-1) second players’ behavior
9. In particular the first players are responding to 
the second players’ punishment behavior. Experiencing punishment significantly 
decreases opportunistic behavior.  





     
 
Contingency table. The entries are numbers of subjects. Punishment games. 
First players’ behavior (rows) conditional to past (t-1) second players’ behavior (columns). Note: 
Not-opportunistic=player 1 moves left at time t, opportunistic=player 1 moves right at t; not-
punish=player 2 moved left at t-1, punish=player 2 moved right at t-1. 
                                                 
9 The same test over the first players’ behavior in the punishment game conditional to second players’ past 
(t-2) behavior is not significant (Chi-square=1.28 , p-value=0.25 ). 
Players 2   
Not-punish (t-1)  Punish (t-1) 
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Table 2 shows the result from the second players’ behavior (rows) contingent to first 
players’ behavior at time t-1 (columns). The second players responded to first players’ 
opportunistic behavior (chi-square=9.16, and p-value=0.0025). In particular there is a 
significant increase in punishment as a response to past opportunistic behavior. It is 
interesting to notice that second movers never punished if they had experienced not-
opportunistic behavior at time t-1.  





     
 
Contingency table. The entries are numbers of subjects. Punishment games. 
Second players’ behavior (rows) conditional to past (t-1) first players’ behavior 
(columns). Note: Not-punish=first player moves left at time t, punish=first player moves 
right at t; not-opportunistic=first player moved left at time t-1, opportunistic=first player 
moved right at t-1. 
 
Table 3 shows the behavior of first players in the trust games. The contingency table 
represents first players’ trusting behavior (rows) contingent to second players’ reciprocal 
behavior at time t-1 (columns). We reject the hypothesis of independence between rows 
and columns (p-value=0.013), i.e. trust depends on earlier second movers’ reciprocal 
behavior.
10  
                                                 
10 The same test over the first players’ behavior in the trust game conditional to second players’ past (t-2) 
behavior is not significant (Chi-square=1.42 , p-value=0.23 ). 




























Contingency table. The entries are numbers of subjects. Trust games.  
First players’ behavior (rows) conditional to past (t-1) second players’ behavior 
(columns). Note: Not-trust=first player moves left at time t, trust=first player moves right 
at time t; reciprocate=second player moved left at time t-1, defect=second player moved 
right at time t-1. 
 
Table 4 illustrates second players’ behavior in the trust game. The chi-square test cannot 
reject the hypothesis of independence between the rows (second players’ reciprocal 
behavior at time t) and the columns (first players’ trusting behavior at time t-1). This 
indicates that second players in the trust games were no more likely to reciprocate if they 
have been trusted in earlier period.  
 
Table 4  
 
 
Contingency table. The entries are numbers of subjects. Trust games.  
Second players’ behavior (rows) conditional to past (t-1) first players’ behavior 
(columns). Note: Reciprocate=second player moves left at time t, defect=second player 
moves left at time t; not-trusted=first player moved left at time t-1, trusted=first player 
moved right at time t-1. 
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4.4 Condition 1 vs. Condition 2. Support for hypotheses 1 and 2: Sequence matters 
Table 5 reports Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences of means of subjects’ behavior in 
condition 1 and condition 2. The first line shows no significant difference between the 
mean proportions of first players moving left (not-opportunistic behavior) in the 
punishment games of condition 1 and condition 2 (p-value=0.79). The second line shows 
that punishment in condition 2 is higher than in condition 1 (p-value=0.09), this result is 
in support of hypothesis 1. The third line shows that trust is significantly higher in 
condition 2 than in condition 1 (p-value=0.049), in support of hypothesis 2. Finally, the 
fourth line shows no significant difference between reciprocity in condition 2 and 
condition 1 (p-value=0.218). These results show that having experienced a sequence of 
punishment games as second player or a sequence of trust games as first player affect 
behavior. In particular, it increases subject’s sensitivity to other subjects’ behavior. They 
tend to attribute to the others more responsibility and intentionality for their actions. 
 
Table 5 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences between samples means proportion (µ) of 
behaviors in condition 1 (C1) and condition 2 (C2). 
 
Samples  µC1  µC2  Normal statistic with 
correction, z  p-value 
       
First players non-
opportunistic behavior in 
punishment games 
0.32 0.33  -0.26  0.79 
Second players punishment 
behavior in punishment 
games  
0.18 0.32  -1.68  0.093 
First players trust behavior 
in trust games 
0.38 0.62  -1.96  0.049 
Second players reciprocal 
behavior in trust games 
0.35 0.54  -1.23  0.218 
´ 
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4.5 Test for alternative explanations: Efficiency and inequality aversion 
Our design allows us to distinguish consistent patterns of behavior in terms of efficiency 
(desire to maximize the total payoffs)
11 and inequality aversion
12. As shown from the 
individual data (see Appendix A1, and A2), there is no significant evidence of consistent 
patterns of behavior motivated by efficiency and inequality aversion. Only five subjects 
followed the “efficiency pattern” in both sequences (ID# 39, 41, and 44, in condition 1; 
ID# 3, and 13, in condition 2), and only one subject behaved consistently with a pattern 
of inequality aversion (ID# 32, in condition 1). Table 6 reports relative frequencies of 
patterns of behavior in the sequence of punishment and trust games, respectively. The 
patterns of behavior motivated by efficiency or inequality aversion are never relatively 
more important than other behaviors.
13  
Table 6.  
Relative frequencies of different patterns of behavior 





  player 1  E.  R L L  0/24=0  2/15=0.13  2/24=0.08 
Punishment 
games    I.A.  L R R  2/24=0.08  1/15=0.07  3/39=0.08 
  player 2  E.  l l l, l l X, l X l, X l l  13/19=0.68  5/13=0.38  18/32=0.56 





r l l, l r l, l l r, r l X, r 
X l, X r l, l r X, l X r, 
X l r  5/19=0.26 8/13=0.62 13/32=0.41 
  player 1  E.  R R R  6/24=0.25  5/15=0.33  11/39=0.28 
Trust games    I.A.  L L L  11/24=0.46  0/15=0  11/39=0.28 






r l l, l r l, l l r, r l X, r 
X l, X r l, l r X, l X r, 
X l r, r r r, r r X, r X r, 
X r r  5/7=0.71  7/10= 0.7  12/17=0.71 
Note: E.= Efficiency, I.A.= Inequality Aversion. L=left, R=right, player 1. l=left, r=right, player 2. X=no observation. 
                                                 
11 See Charness and Rabin (2002). 
12 We have the same pattern for the two theories on inequality aversion: Bolton-Ockenfels (2000), and 
Fehr-Schmidt (1999). 
13 With the exception of the case of second players in the punishment games in condition 1, in which the 
relative frequency of efficiency based behavior is 0.68.   19
 
5 Discussion  
In our experiment subjects played two sequences of two-person extensive form games 
with anonymous and different counterparts. The payoffs structure of the games 
determined underlying reciprocity responses. The anonymity and the changing of 
counterparts avoided reputation effects. This procedure should have induced the subjects 
to play without changing their behaviors through the games, as if they were playing one-
shot game each time. This was not the case. Results show subjects’ sensitivity to the 
change (introduced by the experimental design) of the levels of the determinants of the 
“reciprocal interaction.” In the sequence of punishment games we increased through the 
three games the level of the potential “pain” inflicted by the first movers to the second 
movers. In the sequence of trust games we increased through the three games the second 
movers’ benefits determined by the first movers’ trusting behavior. Results show 
subjects’ sensitivity to these changes. The second players in the punishment games 
punished more through the sequence; and the second players in the trust games defected 
less through the sequence. This corroborates previous findings by Cooper and Kraker 
Stockman (2002) that: subjects learn to punish over time. Subjects do not show fixed 
preferences through the sequences of our experiment. Indeed, subjects’ preferences 
depend on other players’ behavior, and on the interpretation of these behaviors in terms 
of their intentions (in analogy to the findings of Brandts and Solà, 2001; and Falk et al., 
1999.)   
The second part of our analysis is dedicated to the study of different behaviors 
between the two conditions of our experimental design. The only difference between 
condition 1 and condition 2 is the order of the sequences played, i.e., in condition 1 the   20
subjects played first the three punishment games and then the three trust games, whereas, 
in condition 2 the subjects played first the three trust games and then the three 
punishment games. The order and the payoffs structure of the games inside each 
sequence is the same in both conditions. Results show that the subjects (second players) 
in condition 2 punished more than the subjects in condition 1, and that the subjects in 
condition 2 trusted more than the subjects in condition 1. We conclude that different 
experiences determine different behaviors. The second players in condition 1 experienced 
a sequence of increased pain (inflicted by the first players), before they became first 
players in the sequence of trust games. They trusted less than the first players in condition 
2. The first players that started with the sequence of trust games experienced a high level 
of defection before they became second players in the sequence of punishment games. 
They punished more than the second players in the punishment games in condition 1. The 
negative emotion caused by having experienced defection (from others) is carried over 
from one sequence to another. Subjects compare their obtained outcomes with the 
outcome they would have obtained if their counterpart behaved non-opportunistically. 
This comparison, based on upward counterfactual, determines “negative” emotional 
response that “influences on subsequent judgments, making salient the role of other 
people in causing negative events and perhaps events in general” (cf. Keltner et al., 1993, 
pp.751). We named this response as reciprocity-based anger. Experiencing anger 
determines punishment and non-trusting behaviors. 
Negative reciprocity is triggered by emotional response to others’ behavior. In this 
sense emotion contributes to the enforcement of social norms (see Gintis, 2000; Bowles   21
and Gintis, 2001; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; and Carpenter et al., 2002.)
14 Our results show 
that subjects are willing to enforce the social norm of cooperation even if this process is 
based on costly punishment. 
We conclude that different behaviors are determined by different emotional 
experience. Indeed, experienced emotions matter in reciprocal interactions. As stated by 
Bowles and Gintis (2001): “Adherence to social norms is underwritten by emotions, not 
only by the expectation of future reciprocation.” 
      
                                                 
14 We adopt the definition of social norm given by Fehr and Gächter (2000 b): “It is: 1) a behavioral 
regularity; that is 2) based on a socially shared belief how one ought to behave; which triggers 3) the 
enforcement of the prescribed behavior by informal social sanctions.” (cf. pp.9)   22
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Appendix A1 
Individual data. Condition 1 
     session 1       session 2 
ID    position  P1 P2 P3      position  T1 T2 T3 
1  1 R R R    2  r  X  r 
2 1 L L L    2 X l  l 
3  1 R R R    2  l  X X 
4 1 L R  R    2 X X r 
5  1 R R R    2  r  X X 
6 1 L R  R    2 X X X 
7 1 L R  R    2 r  l X 
8 1 R R L    2 X X X 
9 1 L L L    2 r  r  l 
10 1  L R R    2  l  l  X 
11 1 L R L    2 X X X 
12 1 R R R    2 X  r  X 
13  1 L L L    2 X X l 
14 1 R R R    2 X X X 
15 1 R R R    2  r  X X 
16 1 R R L    2 r X X 
17 1 R R L    2  l X r 
18 1  L  L R    2  r  r  r 
19 1 R R R    2  r  X X 
20 1 R R R    2 X  r  X 
21 1 R R R    2 X X X 
22 1 R R R    2 X X  l 
23  1 L L L    2 r X X 
24 1 R R R    2 X X X 
25 2  l  r X    1 R L R 
26  2 X X r    1 L L L 
27 2  l  r  X    1 R R L 
28  2 X l  l    1 L L L 
29 2  l  l  X    1 R R R 
30  2 X l  l    1 L L L 
31 2 X X l    1 R L L 
32  2 r  r X    1 L L L 
33 2 X l X    1 R L L 
34 2 X X  l    1 R R R 
35 2 X  l  l    1  L  L R 
36  2 l l l    1  L  L  L 
37  2 X l  r    1 L L L 
38  2 l l l    1  L  L  L 
39 2  l  l  X    1 R R R 
40  2 l l l    1  L  L  L 
41 2  l  X  l    1 R R R 
42 2 X  l  X    1 R R R 
43 2  l  l  r    1 R L L 
44  2 l l l    1  R  R  R 
45  2 l X l    1 L L L 
46  2 l l l    1  L  L  L 
47  2 X l  l    1 L L L 
48 2  l  r X      1 R L L 
 
Note: L=left, R=right, player 1. l=left, r=right, player 2. X=no observation.   27
Appendix A2 
Individual data. Condition 2 
      sequence 1        sequence 2 
ID position T1  T2  T3     position  P1  P2 P3 
1 1 R R R    2  X  X l 
2 1 R L L    2  r  r l 
3 1 R R R    2  l  X l 
4 1 L L R    2  l  X l 
5 1 R R R    2  l  r X 
6 1 R L L    2  X  l r 
7 1 R R L    2  l  r X 
8 1 R R R    2  X  l r 
9 1 L L L    2  r  l r 
10  1 R R L    2  l  r r 
11 1  R L  L    2  l  r  X 
12 1  R L  L    2  l  X  l 
13 1  R R R    2  X  l  l 
14  1 R R L    2  l  l X 
15 1  L  R R    2  X  X X 
16 2  l  X X    1  L  R R 
17  2  r  X  X    1 R L  L 
18 2  l  l  l    1  R  R R 
19 2  X  r  X    1  R  R R 
20  2  r l  X    1 R L  R 
21 2  r  l  X    1  L  L L 
22 2  l  X X    1  R  R R 
23 2  l  l  l    1  L  L R 
24  2  X  X  X    1 R L  L 
25 2  r  l  r    1  R  R L 
26  2 r X l    1  R R  R 
27 2  r  r  X    1  R  R R 
28 2  l  l  r    1  L  R R 
29  2 r X r    1  R  R  R 
30 2  X  l  l      1  L  R L 
 
Note: L=left, R=right, player 1. l=left, r=right, player 2. X=no observation. 